Introduction
It is now beyond doubt that when students reason during school science, they often refer to conceptions that are derived from out-of-school experiences and are poor proxies for science orthodoxy. For instance, reference to unorthodox conceptions is documented in a significant proportion of the c.8000 entries that comprise Duit's (2007) bibliography. Scholars vary over the terms that they use to characterise these conceptions: misconceptions, prior conceptions, alternative conceptions, alternative frameworks, everyday theories and intuitive notions are a sample of the numerous phrases that have traditionally been used (see, e.g., Driver & Erickson, 1983 ).
Scholars also differ over whether they regard the conceptions as organised into tightly structured theories (McCloskey, 1983; Vosniadou, 1994) , loose conglomerates (diSessa, 1993; Wagner, 2006) , or a mixture of both (Howe, 1998; Oliva, 1999) .
However, reference to unorthodox conceptions during reasoning in science is an established fact, and nowadays is widely recognised as a challenge that educators must address. Science teaching should, in other words, support processes of change from the use of unorthodox conceptions during reasoning to the use of received ones.
Taking the need for change as established, the primary aim behind this paper is to contribute a new perspective upon how change can be supported.
As Scott, Asoko and Leach (2007) point out, contemporary approaches to conceptual change are heavily influenced by the work of Posner, Strike, Hewson and Gertzog (1982) . According to Posner et al., contexts, where students seldom regard themselves as on the threshold of research programmes. However, it is hard to imagine compliance with the first three conditions not being necessary, and so there have been numerous attempts to incorporate them into teaching programmes. Typically the programmes require students to conduct experiments to test their initial conceptions (Harlen, 1999; Hodson, 1993; Scott et al., 2007) . It is anticipated that results will, on the one hand, trigger dissatisfaction with existing conceptions through their failure to provide support, and on the other hand, render the target science both comprehensible and plausible through compatible data.
In reality, research evaluating the approach has obtained patchy results, with many studies reporting minimal impact upon conceptual understanding (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Duit, 1999; Duit, Treagust, & Widodo, 2008; Harlen, 1999; Limón, 2001 ).
Discussions of why evaluations have proved disappointing typically revolve around three types of explanation: a) experiments often fail to generate the requisite data; b) Posner et al.'s three conditions may be necessary but they are insufficient; c) cognitive limitations eclipse the significance of experimental evidence. Experimental failure is graphically and comprehensively documented in Claxton (1991) , with research indicating that inadequate control of variables is often responsible (Howe, Tolmie, & Sofroniou, 1999; Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, & Andersen, 1995; Schauble, 1990; Scottish Executive Education Department, 2005) . As regards possible insufficiencies in Posner et al.'s conditions, social-constructivist critiques (see Duit, 1999; Duit et al., 2008; Limón, 2001) show how cultural (primarily discursive) practices shape the significance accorded to experiments. A specific illustration appears in Howe, Rodgers, and Tolmie (1990) : when 8-to 12-year-old children conducted experiments in small groups, any value from evidence regarding which objects floated or sank depended on the discussions that the evidence generated. In held similar ideas and debate was thereby precluded, conceptual understanding was identical at pre-and post-test, despite access to equivalent experimental evidence.
As regards cognitive limitations, difficulties have been identified at all ages with adopting the meta-cognitive perspective required to link conceptions with experimental data (Driver, Leach, Millar, & Scott, 1996; Kuhn, 2001) . Conceptions or data can be brought into focus but seldom both together. Meta-cognitive difficulties of this kind also help to explain the 'confirmation biases' that have been reported, i.e. the apparent discounting of experimental results that counter preconceptions (e.g. Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Koslowski, 1996; Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney, 1978) . This said, discounting also occurs when the conceptual implications of discordant results are recognised, suggesting that confirmation biases need to be acknowledged as a limitation in their own right. For instance, many of the 9-to 12-year olds reported in Howe and Tolmie (2003) expressed surprise at different rates of cooling from black and white containers because they 'knew' colour makes no difference. They usually attributed their results to defective thermometers (see Chinn & Brewer, 1993, for equivalent examples with other topics). Moreover, neuroscience research demonstrates how data that confirm preconceptions and data that disconfirm both result in brain activation (Fugelsang & Dunbar, 2005) . The key difference is that only confirmatory data activate brain areas associated with learning; disconfirmatory data activate areas associated with error detection.
Nevertheless, while the problems must be recognised, it is unclear whether they should be interpreted as challenging Posner et al.'s (1982) Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993) . Karmiloff-Smith (1992) reiterates the point in the specific context of science. Second, if experiments are sufficiently robust to be consistent with curriculum targets, they will, of necessity, be decontextualised from the lifetime of social and physical experiences that support initial conceptions. They may therefore appear isolated and meaningless rather than momentous. So the question is raised of whether an alternative to experiments can be identified to fulfil Posner et al.'s conditions, and if it can be whether it has positive implications for conceptual change. The remainder of this paper attempts to demonstrate that, for some areas of science at least, the answer may be affirmative.
Specifically, a non-experimental strategy for promoting conceptual change is described that concurs with Posner et al. but: a) separates the challenging of existing conceptions from the highlighting of target alternatives; b) calls on experiences that are just as familiar and personally meaningful as the ones that support initial
conceptions. An encouraging evaluation study is then reported.
An alternative strategy for promoting conceptual change
The potential relevance of tacit understanding
The strategy stemmed from evidence that, for some areas of science, the conceptions that students call upon when reasoning represent only a proportion of their full Substantial differences have been demonstrated between the conceptual knowledge displayed when tacit engagement suffices and the conceptual knowledge displayed during reasoning. Unsurprisingly, given the lesser task demands, these differences usually suggest that the former is superior. For instance, Reed, McLeod and Dienes (2010) found that skilled ball players, who reliably make the eye gaze adjustments that allow balls to be caught, show no comprehension of the role of eye gaze when explaining how catching is achieved. Displaying scenarios where rolling cylinders of varying mass collide with a stationary cylinder, Kotovsky and Baillargeon (1998) found that 6-month-old infants show surprise when post-collision speed fails (nonnaturally) to be proportionate to the rolling cylinders' mass but not when it is
proportionate. Yet Inhelder and Piaget (1958 -later Howe, 1998) found that throughout the primary school age range, children have difficulties reasoning about the distances that objects of varying mass roll along tracks.
It was the ability to differentiate between natural and non-natural events, illustrated in the work of Kotovsky and Baillargeon, which suggested the strategy to be developed below. In principle, the ability seemed to offer opportunities for separating evidence that challenges initial conceptions from evidence that supports curriculum targets and for employing evidence that is familiar and meaningful. As In short, the suggested strategy involves engaging tacit understanding through tasks that require discrimination between natural and non-natural events in the hope of boosting the conceptual knowledge that is displayed when reasoning. To provide a concrete prototype (and as a prelude to evaluation), the strategy has now been embodied in computer software, in particular in a programme that starts by requiring events to be predicted, i.e. a reasoning task. It then presents simulations of predicted events, followed with simulations of how events proceed in reality and invitations to make comparisons. Simulations were essential given the need to present non-natural displays when predictions are incorrect, and they have the advantage of sidestepping the 'failed experiment' problem outlined above. While questions have been raised about whether students treat simulations as genuine representations (Hennessy & 
Object fall software
The topic selected for software implementation was patterns of motion when objects fall after being dropped from some height. Student reasoning about both the direction and speed of motion has been extensively explored, with significant errors reported.
With direction, the focus has been upon the paths along which objects travel when they fall after moving horizontally, e.g. when balls roll over cliffs or litter is dropped from moving vehicles (e.g. Anderson, Tolmie, Howe, Mayes, & Mackenzie, 1992; Eckstein & Kozhevnikov, 1997; Eckstein & Shemesh, 1989; Hood, 1995; Kaiser, Profitt, & McCloskey 1985; Krist, 2000; Marioni, 1989; McCloskey 1983; Whitaker, 1983) . Regardless of student age (from preschool-to undergraduate-level), the main finding is that objects are variously predicted to fall vertically, travel backwards, fall diagonally forwards, or continue horizontally in space before falling vertically.
However, they are seldom predicted to trace the parabolic paths in a forward direction that they actually follow. With speed, the emphasis has been upon fall from rest, with two main messages that again apply across a wide age range (e.g. Baker, Murray, & Hood, 2009; Cahyadi & Butler, 2004; Champagne, Klopfer, & Anderson, 1980; Chinn & Malhotra, 2002; Gunstone & White, 1981; Hast & Howe, 2009; Howe, 1998; Nachtigall, 1982; van Hise, 1988 ). The first is that when objects vary only in mass heavy items are typically predicted to fall faster than light items rather than travel at speeds that, even taking air resistance into account, are usually almost identical. Another is that, regardless of mass, objects are expected to reach maximum velocity quickly, and then fall with constant or decelerating velocity.
At the same time, there is evidence that students are capable of differentiating between natural and non-natural displays of object fall in precisely the contexts that are associated with faulty reasoning. For instance, Kaiser, Profitt, Whelan and Hecht (1992) found that when undergraduates viewed computer-simulated kegs falling from aeroplanes, they consistently judged forward parabolas as natural and other trajectories as non-natural. Kim and Spelke (1999) obtained equivalent results with preschool children from two years of age, using judgment tasks and tasks that involved monitoring of eye gaze as indices of surprise. When Shanon (1976) presented videotapes of balls falling with constant or accelerating velocity to an undergraduate sample, he found that constant velocity was consistently judged as nonnatural, while acceleration was regarded as natural. Moreover, using a series of computer-simulations, the present authors [Reference to be included after review]
found primary school children capable of differentiating natural direction and speed from non-natural direction and speed during fall: a) from rest; b) after horizontal motion; c) through air alone; d) through air and then water. The children were much less successful at predicting direction and speed with comparable scenarios.
With evidence across a wide age range for tacit understanding that surpasses the understanding displayed in reasoning, object fall was regarded as an appropriate (and educationally relevant) topic. Accordingly, the software, which was programmed using Macromedia Director, used scenarios that showed a girl in a hot air balloon, holding and then dropping a ball, these scenarios having been employed in the At the moment of release, the action froze, and predictions of subsequent motion were invited. With the direction scenarios, the prediction phase began with the appearance of three small white circles under the ball: a) directly below; b) behind; c) in front (see Figure 1c ). This was accompanied with an instruction to select the point that the ball would travel through. Once a circle was selected, this turned red and the other circles disappeared. At the same time three further white circles appeared below the selected circle: a) if the selected circle was directly under the ball, the new circles were directly below, behind, and in front; b) if the selected circle was behind the ball, the new circles were directly below this circle, parabolically behind and diagonally behind; c) if the selected circle was in front of the ball, the new circles were directly Figure 1d ). The instruction to select a point also re-appeared. Once a second circle was chosen this too turned red, the other circles disappeared, and three further circles appeared below the second circle in the same relative positions, accompanied with the instruction to select. While the first and second circles were always located in air, the third set varied with medium, i.e. just above the grass or under the water's surface (just below with the green ball depicting where it would naturally float; on the pool's floor with the silver ball reflecting the fact it would sink).
With the speed scenarios, the prediction phase involved answering questions, with response options (the words that are capitalised below) presented under each question and selected by clicking with the computer mouse. Order of options was varied randomly each time the task was presented. With scenarios where the ball fell only through air, questioning began with: 'As the ball falls through the air will the speed CHANGE or stay the SAME?' If this question was answered correctly via CHANGE, a second question followed: 'As the ball falls will its speed get SLOWER or FASTER?' There was no second question if the initial question was answered incorrectly via SAME. With scenarios where the ball fell through air and water, questioning began with: 'Will the ball fall at the SAME speed through the air and the water or at DIFFERENT speeds?' The follow-up question after correct selection of DIFFERENT was: 'Will the ball travel slower/faster through the AIR or the WATER?' with use of 'slower' or 'faster' determined randomly for each presentation.
Once more, there was no second question after incorrect selection of SAME.
With both the direction and speed scenarios, correct predictions triggered the message 'Well done! You are correct' inside a gold star to the right of the screen. This was accompanied with 'Click upon GO to see the ball fall', with clicking activating a and then 'Why are they different?' The option was available of replaying the incorrect and/or correct motion as many times as was deemed necessary to answer the questions. The computer programme was designed to record details of button presses at all stages, including predictions.
Method

Overview
With the strategy implemented in software, the primary issue was whether the software had positive implications for conceptual change, and this was the issue that the evaluation study was intended to resolve. It was recognised that a positive outcome would raise further questions, e.g. whether the software was effective because it implemented the strategy, but it seemed advisable to address one issue at a time. Accordingly, after securing university ethical approval, a three-stage study was conducted with a sample of 8-to 12-year-old children. This age group was selected During the first stage of the study, the sample was pre-tested to establish baseline reasoning about object fall. For the second stage, about two-thirds of the pretested sample were assigned to work with the software, with the remaining third intended as an untutored control. Since the evaluation was designed merely to ascertain whether the software supported conceptual growth, comparison with an untutored control group was appropriate, rather than, for instance, comparison with a group that studied object fall in an alternative fashion. Half of the children selected to work with the software (i.e. one third of the pre-tested sample) did this individually, with an adult on hand to highlight relevant features and offer guidance upon request.
The other half worked with a classmate, with the adult offering guidance upon request but otherwise being deliberately passive. As noted, social-constructivist analyses have drawn attention to the cultural context in which procedures derived from Posner et al. (1982) are situated, emphasising discourse practices. While exploring cultural influences was not a primary aim, it was recognised that the software could not be presented in a contextually 'neutral' fashion. Accordingly, an attempt was made to mimic two contexts, which not only occur frequently during computer-based sessions in classrooms (Crook, 1994) but are also known to be associated with markedly different patterns of discourse (Anderson, Tolmie, McAteer, & Demissie, 1993) . The final stage of the study involved a post-test, which was administered to the children who worked with the software and to the control group. consenting to participation, all children in the relevant age range were potentially included. However, absence from school meant that six children completed only one of the pre-and post-tests. With these children excluded, the sample comprised 139 children (77 girls). Forty-eight children were from Year 4, 47 were from Year 5, and 44 were from Year 6, with a sample mean age of 9.73 years (SD = 0.95).
Pre-and post-tests
The pre-and post-tests each comprised 16 items, which were identical across the two tests. Each item was associated with one of three topics: a) a ball falling from a hot air balloon (as with the software), n = 5 items; b) a box falling from a helicopter, n = 6 items; c) a box falling from a train on a high bridge, n = 5 items. The items were selected from a pool of 32 items that had previously been piloted with a similar aged (but different) sample of children. Rasch analysis of pilot predictions (Bond & Fox, 2007 ) was used to identify items of varying difficulty, whose 'fit values' were nevertheless consistent with a uni-dimensional scale. Sufficient items fulfilled these criteria to permit the selection of eight items that addressed the direction of fall and eight items that addressed speed change, while also ensuring that each set of eight covered all possible combinations of fall from rest vs. after motion, fall onto grass vs.
into water, and fall of a heavy vs. light object. To facilitate presentation, the items were organised into two blocks, with one block addressing direction and the other block addressing speed. There was a fixed order of blocks during presentation and a With each of the eight direction items, the text included instructions to indicate where the object lands by marking the illustration with a cross and then to draw the path that the object follows as it falls. With the four speed items that addressed fall onto grass, the text was 'As the ball/box falls through the air, will the invited to insert their name, school, class and gender on the front cover, together with the date. Thereafter, a researcher took the group through the items, displaying them in sequence on a large screen using PowerPoint, ensuring that the children were looking at the corresponding item in their booklets, talking them through what the task involved, and inviting them to enter responses in their booklets. The researcher also highlighted features that were hard to discern from the booklets alone, i.e. whether the carrier was stationary or moving prior to the ball/box's release, whether the ball/box was light or very heavy, and the intended absence of wind. The class teachers were always present during the pre-test to assist with procedural questions and to ensure that there was no copying of neighbours (but not to help with item solution). The test took approximately 25 minutes to complete.
Roughly one third of each class was assigned at random to each of the secondstage conditions, i.e. individually but with adult guidance (designated, for brevity, the 'single' condition), with a classmate but with minimal adult guidance (designated the 'pair' condition), and untutored (designated the 'control' condition). This resulted in 44 children being placed in the single condition, 48 being placed in the pair condition and 47 being placed in the control group, with no significant differences between the conditions over gender composition (X 2 (2) = 1.44, ns) or school year (X 2 (4) = 0.17, ns). The children assigned to the pair and single conditions came to a private room at their school, where the researcher who had administered the pre-test welcomed them, provided an overview of the procedure, invited participation and, with consent to continue (given in all cases), obtained basic demographic information. Thereafter she directed the children to a Dell Latitude D820 laptop computer, and showed them how to respond using the computer mouse.
With the children who were working in pairs, the researcher then withdrew to another part of the room, only intervening on the rare occasions that she was asked for procedural advice. On the other hand, she stayed with the children who were in the single condition, again offering procedural assistance upon request but this time also highlighting key features. For instance, she asked the children to describe and explain the difference between the incorrect and correct motion after these had been viewed, scaffolding the use of appropriate explanatory factors. Regardless of condition, the researcher used a grid to record whether each software scenario was associated with: procedures that were identical to the pre-test.
Scoring
Five measures of conceptual knowledge were obtained from the pre-and post-tests: 
Results
As noted, the pre-and post-test items were selected from a larger pool, which had been tested with a pilot sample. Rasch analysis of the predictions made during piloting was used to create a uni-dimensional scale of varying item difficulty. As a result, the CP/C, CP/P and CP/S measures can be assumed to be reliable. On the other hand, explanations were not subject to Rasch analysis during scale development (even Acceptable outcomes were achieved (for CE, α = 0.70; for IE, α = 0.76).
Accordingly, analyses were conducted on the total scores that the children obtained on each of the five measures, without any need to examine specific items separately.
The key question was whether working with the software proved beneficial. With all three measures, performance was significantly higher at post-test than at pretest. The main effects of condition were non-significant, but with all three measures there were significant interactions between test and condition (for CP/C, F (2, 136) = 8.09, p < 0.001; for CP/P, F (2, 136) = 5.18 p < 0.01; for CP/S, F (2, 136) = 5.16, p < 0.01). One-way ANOVAs were conducted to clarify these interactions. As can be seen in Table 1 , there were no significant differences between the conditions at pretest on any of the three prediction measures. However, by post-test, all differences were statistically significant, with the control group invariably performing below the children who worked with the software. In fact, the mean post-test scores obtained by the control group were little different from their mean pre-test scores, with mean CP/S scores actually declining slightly across the two tests. In other words, it was only the children who worked with the software who progressed from pre-to post-test. This As regards the factors that influence direction and speed, conceptual growth would be signaled by pre-to post-test increases in CE scores and pre-to post-test decreases in IE scores. With this in mind, Table 1 suggests modest benefits from the software for CE scores in the pair condition and for IE scores in the single condition.
The control group, by contrast, obtained lower CE scores at post-test than pre-test and higher IE scores. Nevertheless, all changes are modest, and the two-way ANOVAs produced no significant main effects of test or condition and no significant interactions between test and condition. Follow-up analyses are not therefore appropriate. Overall then, the software had unmistakable benefits for the conceptual dimensions that were its actual focus (patterns of direction and speed), particularly when the children worked in pairs with a classmate. However, its implications for the underlying determinants of motion were, at best, embryonic.
Thinking about why it was the CP/C, CP/P and CP/S measures that were associated with the strongest gains, it may be significant that, as Table 1 makes clear, pre-test scores on all three measures were considerably below the maximum possible.
Thus, making appropriate predictions was a significant challenge, and this may have focused the children's attention on the prediction element, i.e. inputting the anticipated motion and receiving feedback from the simulations. They may have paid less attention to the stages at which explanations were highlighted, i.e. interpreting why the predicted and correct motion differed and answering the two written questions at the end. Indeed, if the children's focus can be assumed to have been upon predictions, the differences between the single and pair conditions may also become interpretable. Table 2 shows the mean number of scenarios on which the researcher (pair condition). The most striking difference relates to discussion of the predictions, which was never recorded in the single condition but was the most frequently used discourse category in the pair condition. With 63% of the scenarios around which prediction discussion occurred, the focus was on predictions alone, i.e. asserting possibilities and confirming or challenging these. With the remaining 37%, there was also an attempt to justify positions. In either case, such discussion would have been highly salient, if formulating predictions was the children's major focus. Therefore, the fact that it occurred only with the pairs could be significant. [Insert Table 2 ]
Discussion and implications
The design of the object fall software was informed by three considerations. The first was that Posner et al.'s (1982) conditions for effecting conceptual change have normally been interpreted as requiring experimental appraisal of initial conceptions. It has been assumed that results will simultaneously challenge these conceptions and render the target science as comprehensible and plausible. The second consideration related to some potentially misleading implications of using experimental appraisal, and therefore of its patchy success in supporting conceptual growth. Specifically, questions were raised about an approach that necessitates viewing evidence simultaneously from two perspectives, and uses data that is inevitably dissociated from personal experience. The third consideration was the possibility of engaging students' tacit understanding both to separate the creation of dissatisfaction from the introduction of alternatives, and to utilise experiences that are familiar and personally meaningful. However, while the three considerations informed the software's design, As regards the software's effectiveness, the children who worked with it made significantly greater progress than control children in the conceptual understanding underpinning predictions. This was true for both direction of fall and changes in speed. Less progress was however detected for explanatory factors. With reference to pre-test scores (i.e. as shown in Table 1 ), it was suggested that even the formulation of predictions would have proved challenging for the participating children, and therefore this may have pre-occupied them to the exclusion of background factors.
Certainly, if the children were pre-occupied with predictions, it was more likely due to the formidable conceptual content than, say, to practical difficulties with operating the software. As Table 2 shows, 'researcher intervention' occurred relatively infrequently, implying that the children quickly mastered what they were expected to do and found the software easy to use. This of course augurs well for eventual application in classrooms. However, even if conceptual challenge did result in a focus upon predictions, it is unclear whether this is sufficient to account for the limited progress with explanatory factors. To explore further, it would be desirable to work with samples whose pre-test scores indicate stronger initial knowledge, perhaps because they had benefited from using the software on previous occasions. Indeed, the implications of repeated software usage would be of general interest. Assuming pre-occupation with predictions, it was proposed earlier that the pairs' superiority might be related to the fact that discussion of predictions only occurred between classmates. If discussion was significant, it could have been for at least two reasons. On the one hand, the significance could have stemmed from the exchanges (roughly one-third of the total prediction discussions) where the children offered justifications for their predictions. Justificatory dialogue has been shown on numerous occasions to be beneficial for conceptual understanding (see Howe, 2010 , for a review of many studies, including ones relevant for science). On the other hand, the dialogue's content may not have been critical in this particular context. Its very occurrence might have been sufficient to slow the children down and make them think carefully before making predictions. Actually, this second interpretation is probably the most plausible: the justifications usually referred to explanatory factors and therefore had they been crucial for boosting predictions, growth in explanatory understanding might also have been expected (when, as noted, this was negligible). In any event, assuming discussion of predictions was significant for some reason, it becomes important to reflect on its non-occurrence in the single condition. It was certainly not precluded in principle, given the researcher's availability for guidance.
Indeed, the researcher was approached at other points in the task (see Table 2 ).
Perhaps children regard adult help during initial problem solving as illegitimate. contributes. As noted, the engagement of tacit understanding has the potential to separate the creation of dissatisfaction from the introduction of alternatives, and to utilise experiences that are familiar and meaningful. Researchers might wish to assess their relative contribution to positive outcomes. While such issues can be flagged here only as matters for future research, there is significance already in the fact that tacit understanding has this twin potential, and that software which accesses this understanding can support conceptual growth. At minimum, it shows that viable alternatives to traditional experimental appraisal do exist, and it is therefore premature to draw pessimistic inferences about conceptual change from studies that examine experimental appraisal to the exclusion of these alternatives. In other words, the study highlights the fact that conclusions to date have been grounded in research that adopts an overly restricted framework, which can and should be addressed.
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